Remarks of Ambassador Cui Tiankai at Center for Strategic and International Studies
崔天凱大使在戰(zhàn)略與國際問題研究中心的講話

July 12, 2016
2016年7月12日

Thank you, Doctor Hamre,
謝謝哈姆雷博士。

We are here today to discuss the situation of the South China Sea. For that matter, let me first of all refer all of you to two important statements issued by the Chinese side earlier today. One is the Statement of the Government of China on China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea. The other is a statement issued by China’s Foreign Ministry on the award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration established at the request of the Republic of the Philippines. I think these two statements have outlined China’s position with great clarity and authority. I strongly recommend all of you have a careful reading of these two documents.
我們今天在這里討論南海形勢。為此,我愿首先提請大家注意中方今天早些時(shí)候發(fā)布的兩份重要聲明,一份是“中國政府關(guān)于在南海的領(lǐng)土主權(quán)和海洋權(quán)益的聲明”,另一份是“中國外交部關(guān)于應(yīng)菲律賓請求建立的南海仲裁案仲裁庭所作裁決的聲明”。我認(rèn)為這兩份聲明清晰和權(quán)威地闡述了中方的立場。我強(qiáng)烈建議大家認(rèn)真閱讀。

On that basis, within the framework of these two important documents, let me offer a few comments, and maybe we could discuss these points of views.
在此基礎(chǔ)上,我愿在這兩份重要聲明的框架內(nèi)發(fā)表一些看法與各位探討。

First, why does China reject the arbitration?
第一,中國為什么不接受仲裁?

We believe the submission and initiation of this arbitration violates the general practice that arbitration should be premised on state’s consent. China made an optional exceptions declaration back in 2006 in accordance with Article 298 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which excludes issues like maritime delimitation from such processes. This case is done without the consent of China. Also, it exceeds its own jurisdiction. The case was carefully masked. But it is beyond any doubt that the core issues are territorial disputes, and territorial issues are not subject to the UNCLOS.
我們認(rèn)為,提起仲裁背離了仲裁需建立在國家同意基礎(chǔ)上的通行實(shí)踐。中國2006年根據(jù)《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》第298條作出了排除性聲明,將涉及海洋劃界等問題排除在此類程序之外。這起仲裁案是在未經(jīng)中方同意的情況下進(jìn)行的。仲裁庭也超越了權(quán)限。該案雖經(jīng)精心包裝,但毫無疑問其核心問題是領(lǐng)土爭議,而領(lǐng)土問題不由《公約》規(guī)范。

People may say the tribunal may decide on its own jurisdiction. But it does not have a free hand. It has to make the decision in strict accordance with the provisions of the UNCLOS. Failure to recognize that is a matter of professional incompetence. Deliberate disregard is a matter of questionable integrity.
有人也許會(huì)說仲裁庭可以決定自身的管轄權(quán)。但仲裁庭并不能任意行事,而應(yīng)嚴(yán)格按照《公約》的規(guī)定作出決定。對仲裁越權(quán)無知,是專業(yè)水平低下。如果明知故犯,就是道德操守有問題。

Also this case was initiated not out of good will or good faith. We all know that the UN Charter calls for development of friendly relations among its members, and the UNCLOS itself starts with a call for the spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation. But this arbitration case was initiated not in such good faith or good will. It was a clear attempt to use the legal instrument for political purposes.
此外,提起仲裁案并非出于善意。我們都知道《聯(lián)合國憲章》呼吁成員國“發(fā)展國際間友好關(guān)系”,《公約》本身則開宗明義要求堅(jiān)持“互相諒解和合作的精神”。這起仲裁案的提起并非基于上述善意,將法律當(dāng)作政治工具的意圖昭然若揭。

What is more disturbing is that the proceedings will probably do a great deal of damage to the efforts by members of the international community to engage in negotiations and consultation for settlement of any possible disputes. What is astonishing is that this tribunal even belittles the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). The DOC is an instrument that is the result of a decade-long joint diplomatic efforts by China and ASEAN countries, and it embodies the solemn commitments of all parties concerned. This arbitration case will probably open the door of abusing arbitration procedures. It will certainly undermine or weaken motivation of countries to engage in negotiations and consultations for solving their disputes. It will certainly intensify conflicts and confrontation. In the end, it will undermine the authority and effectiveness of international law.
更令人不安的是,仲裁進(jìn)程將嚴(yán)重破壞國際社會(huì)成員通過談判協(xié)商解決任何可能存在的爭議的努力,仲裁庭貶低《南海各方行為宣言》更是令人吃驚。《宣言》是中國和東盟國家近十年共同外交努力的成果,是所有有關(guān)各方作出的莊嚴(yán)承諾。仲裁案為國際上濫用仲裁程序打開了大門,必將損害或削弱各國通過談判協(xié)商解決爭議的動(dòng)力,引發(fā)沖突甚至對抗,并將最終損害國際法的權(quán)威性和有效性。

Such absurd proceedings were taking place in combination with military coercion - with mounting activities by destroyers, aircraft carriers, strategic bombers, reconnaissance planes and many others. I believe this is an outright manifestation of “might is right”. Under these circumstances, China has no alternative but to oppose it and reject it. We are doing this to safeguard our own interests, as we have the right to do so. But more importantly, we are doing this to defend international justice and the true spirit of international law, as we have the responsibility to do so. What is happening to China today could probably happen tomorrow to any other member of the international community, and China has to stand up to it and stop it.
與這出鬧劇同時(shí)上演的還有軍事脅迫行為,例如不斷增加的驅(qū)逐艦、航空母艦、戰(zhàn)略轟炸機(jī)和偵察機(jī)等。我認(rèn)為這是十足的“強(qiáng)權(quán)即公理”的表現(xiàn)。在此情況下,中國別無選擇,只能予以反對和拒絕。中國堅(jiān)決拒絕仲裁案,是維護(hù)自身利益,我們有權(quán)這么做,這也是為堅(jiān)持國際正義,履行捍衛(wèi)國際法基本原則的責(zé)任。今天針對中國的行為,明天就可能針對國際社會(huì)其他成員,中國必須站出來反對并予以制止。

China has the firm will to safeguard its own interests and rights, and international justice. We will not yield to any pressure, be it in the form of military actions, media criticism or some self-claimed legal bodies. And we will certainly not make deals on our core interest just for a few words of praise. Indeed, in any country, if a government fails to stand up and defend its own sovereignty and territory, if it fails to defend the core interest of its own people, there is no image to speak of.
中國維護(hù)自身權(quán)益及國際正義的意志堅(jiān)定不移,不會(huì)屈從于任何壓力,無論這種壓力來自軍事行動(dòng)、媒體攻擊或某些自封的法律機(jī)構(gòu)。中國當(dāng)然也不會(huì)為了幾句好評拿核心利益做交易。事實(shí)上,任何一國政府如果不能站出來捍衛(wèi)本國領(lǐng)土主權(quán),不能捍衛(wèi)本國的核心利益,還有何形象可言?

Second, what has intensified tensions in the region?
第二,人們可能會(huì)問,是什么導(dǎo)致了地區(qū)局勢的緊張?

China has longstanding sovereignty over the islands and reefs in the South China Sea. This sovereignty had not been challenged until the 1970s when more and more Chinese islands and reefs were illegally occupied by others. But even so, the situation was under control. China and other countries in the region were able to manage the differences for so many years, and we were able to develop an overall friendly and cooperative relationship with each other. We even succeeded in formulating the DOC, and there have been small but significant progress towards joint development of resources.
中國長期以來對南海諸島擁有主權(quán),直到20世紀(jì)70年代以前從未受到質(zhì)疑,但70年代后越來越多的中國島礁被他國非法侵占。即便如此,南海局勢依然是可控的。多年來中國和其他地區(qū)國家能夠管控分歧,并且總體上能夠發(fā)展友好合作關(guān)系。我們甚至成功制定了《南海各方行為宣言》,在共同開發(fā)方面也取得了雖不大但很有意義的進(jìn)展。

But tensions started to rise about five or six years ago, about the same time when we began to hear about “pivoting to Asia”. In the last few years, disputes intensified, relations strained and confidence weakened. These issues have taken so much time and energy at so many regional and international fora, and the time and energy should have been spent on promoting cooperation. Has anyone really benefited from this? I don’t think so. Not China, not ASEAN countries, not even the U.S. in the long run. If the Asia-Pacific is destabilized, if the momentum of regional economic growth is weakened, if armed conflict started, everybody’s interest will be hurt, including our interest, the interest of other countries in the region, and I’m sure the interest of the U.S.
但局勢在大約五、六年前開始出現(xiàn)緊張,與大家聽說的“轉(zhuǎn)向亞洲”大體同時(shí)發(fā)生。過去幾年,爭端加劇,關(guān)系緊張,互信削弱。這些問題占據(jù)了國際和地區(qū)議程的太多時(shí)間和精力,而這些時(shí)間和精力本可用來促進(jìn)合作。誰由此獲益呢?我認(rèn)為沒有任何一方從中獲益。中國沒有,東盟沒有,從長遠(yuǎn)看甚至美國也沒有。如果亞太陷入不穩(wěn),如果地區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的勢頭受挫,如果發(fā)生武裝沖突,中國、其他地區(qū)國家、美國等所有各方的利益都會(huì)受損。

As for those people who might have the illusion that they could have a free ride on the pivoting exercise and gain something from it, please go to countries like Iraq, Libya and Syria and ask the people there. Be careful what you wish. You might actually get it.
那些可能幻想搭“轉(zhuǎn)向”進(jìn)程便車并從中牟利的人,請他們到伊拉克、利比亞和敘利亞去問問那兒的人結(jié)果是什么。愿不能亂許,說不定就會(huì)成真。

Some might put the blame on China’s recent reclamation activities. But the fact is that China is the last country to do so, and we are doing so only on the islands and reefs under our own control - islands and reefs where we have people stationed there. We are not trying to take back the islands and reefs that are illegally occupied by others. And speed does not change the nature of the issue. With the completion of the facilities we are building there, I am sure we will be able to offer more international public goods, such as services for civilian use. Of course, the bottom line is that we will be in a position to defend ourselves.
有人可能會(huì)將問題歸咎于中國近期的島礁建設(shè)活動(dòng)。但事實(shí)上中國是最后一個(gè)開始南海島礁建設(shè)的國家,而且只在我們實(shí)際控制且已有人駐守的島礁上進(jìn)行建設(shè)。我們沒有試圖將他國非法侵占的島礁奪回來。建設(shè)速度快慢不能改變活動(dòng)的性質(zhì)。在完成目前的島礁設(shè)施建設(shè)后,中國將能夠提供更多國際公益,例如民事服務(wù)。當(dāng)然,底線是我們必須擁有足夠的自衛(wèi)能力。

Many things have been done under the name of freedom of navigation. But freedom of navigation for commercial vessels has never been a problem in the South China Sea. “Freedom of Navigation Operations” by the U.S. were originally designed as a counter-measure to the provisions of the UNCLOS. Many contracting parties believe that distinctions should be made between freedom of navigation of commercial and civilian vessels, and freedom of navigation of military vessels.
許多事情都是打著“航行自由”的旗號干的。但商船在南海的航行自由從來沒有問題。美國的“航行自由行動(dòng)”原本就是意在針對《公約》有關(guān)規(guī)定的反制行動(dòng)。事實(shí)上,許多締約國都認(rèn)為應(yīng)區(qū)分商用和民用船只的航行自由以及軍用艦只的“航行自由”。

China firmly stands for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, because these sea lanes are the economic life lines for China and many countries in the region. We will do everything possible to safeguard the unimpeded flow of commerce and stop any attempt to destabilize the region. But what worries us is that there might be some self-fulfilling prophecies. Such an assembly of aircraft carriers, airplanes and sophisticated weapons could pose a real threat to the freedom of navigation of commercial and civilian vessels. Such a concentration of fire-power would be a source of concern anywhere in the world.
中國堅(jiān)定支持南海航行自由,因?yàn)槟虾:降朗侵袊驮S多地區(qū)國家的經(jīng)濟(jì)生命線。我們將盡一切努力確保該海域的商業(yè)流通不受阻礙,并制止任何擾亂地區(qū)局勢的企圖。我們感到擔(dān)心的是“自我實(shí)現(xiàn)的預(yù)言”:美方在南海集結(jié)大量軍艦、軍機(jī)、先進(jìn)武器,將真正危及各國商用和民用船只的航行自由。如此大規(guī)模集中火力,這種行為在世界上任何地方都是緊張的根源。

Third, how should we deal with the disputes now?
第三,現(xiàn)在應(yīng)當(dāng)如何處理爭議?

I believe negotiations and consultations among parties concerned still offer the most feasible and effective way. Diplomatic efforts should not, and will not be blocked by a scrap of paper or by a fleet of aircraft carriers. China remains committed to negotiations and consultations with other parties. This position has never changed and will not change. In fact, China has an excellent record in this regard. We have already solved boundary issues with 12 neighbors out of 14 on the land. We even have agreed with Vietnam for part of the maritime delimitation in Beibu Bay (Tonkin Gulf). So we are confident that China and other parties concerned, if not disturbed, will be able to solve the disputes over time through negotiations and consultations. This record of China of solving boundary issues with its neighbors is quite unique in the world. I don’t think you could give me another example of solving such long-standing border issues with its neighbors in the last few decades.
我認(rèn)為,爭議當(dāng)事方談判協(xié)商仍是唯一可行和有效之道。外交努力不應(yīng)、也不會(huì)被一張廢紙和幾艘航母阻擋。中國將繼續(xù)致力于同其他爭議方進(jìn)行談判協(xié)商,這個(gè)立場沒有也不會(huì)改變。事實(shí)上,中國在這方面成績斐然:我們已經(jīng)與14個(gè)陸上鄰國中的12個(gè)劃定了陸地邊界,也與越南完成了北部灣的海洋劃界。我們有信心,中國和其他當(dāng)事方在不受外來干擾的情況下完全可以通過談判協(xié)商逐步解決爭議。中國與鄰國解決邊界問題的成績舉世無雙,我認(rèn)為人們找不出另外一個(gè)能在短短幾十年內(nèi)解決與鄰國長期存在的邊界問題的例子。

So the door is always open for negotiations and consultations. We have full confidence in our relations with our neighbors, particularly with ASEAN countries. Maritime or territorial disputes are only part of the relations between China and some ASEAN countries. It certainly does not represent the entirety of the relationship between China and ASEAN countries as a group. We have been neighbors for centuries. We are actually a community of common destiny. All of us have high stakes in regional stability, peace and prosperity. All of us will benefit a great deal from closer cooperation and enhanced mutual confidence, and none of us will ever pivot to anywhere else in the world.
談判協(xié)商的大門是始終敞開的。我們對與鄰國的關(guān)系,特別是與東盟國家的關(guān)系充滿信心。領(lǐng)土和海洋爭議只是中國與部分東盟國家關(guān)系中的一部分,而不是中國與東盟整體關(guān)系的全部。我們與東盟國家已經(jīng)做了千百年的鄰居,實(shí)際上已成為命運(yùn)共同體。地區(qū)的穩(wěn)定、和平和繁榮與我們均休戚相關(guān)。我們將極大受益于更緊密的合作和更良好的互信。我們沒有哪一個(gè)能夠“轉(zhuǎn)向”到世界任何其他地區(qū)去。

Fourth, what then should we do between China and the U.S.?
第四,中美應(yīng)當(dāng)怎么做?

First of all, these territorial issues in the South China Sea should not become issues between our two countries. We don’t have territorial disputes between us. Still less should they be seen as part of “strategic rivalry” between our two countries. These are just territorial disputes. They should not be magnified or exaggerated. And we should never allow them to define the important relationship between our two countries.
首先,南海爭議不應(yīng)是中美兩國之間的問題。中美之間不存在領(lǐng)土爭議。南海問題更不應(yīng)被視為中美之間的“戰(zhàn)略競爭”。領(lǐng)土爭議不應(yīng)被放大或夸大。我們絕不能讓這個(gè)問題定義如此重要的中美關(guān)系。

Secondly, cold war mentality will not solve problems of today’s world. Today’s world needs more than ever before partnership among countries, especially among the major players. Today’s world needs more than ever before a set of new international relations centered on win-win cooperation. We in China stand for a new model of relationship with the U.S., characterized by no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. We want to see constructive and positive interactions in the Asia-Pacific between our two countries. We are here to see what kind of choice the U.S. will make: how you see the world today, how you see China’s development, and how you see the relationship between our two countries.
其次,冷戰(zhàn)思維解決不了當(dāng)今世界的問題。當(dāng)今世界比以往任何時(shí)候都需要各國,特別是大國之間建立伙伴關(guān)系,構(gòu)建以合作共贏為核心的新型國際關(guān)系。中國致力于與美國建設(shè)不沖突、不對抗、相互尊重、合作共贏的新型大國關(guān)系。我們希望中美在亞太的互動(dòng)是積極和建設(shè)性的。美方如何看待當(dāng)今世界,如何看待中國的發(fā)展,如何看待中美關(guān)系?我們拭目以待。

I know that you have important choices to make this year, but this is also an extremely important choice for you to make. Will you make the right choice? Can we go forward with a win-win partnership? I hope you make the right choice, and I hope you do so in a very clear way.
我知道美國今年正面臨重要的選擇,但美國還有其他極為重要的選擇要作。美國是否會(huì)作出正確的選擇?我們能否推進(jìn)合作共贏的伙伴關(guān)系?希望美國能作出正確選擇,并且以明確的方式作出這樣的選擇。