12. Danger from the Multitude of Slaves. The multitude of slaves has different effects in different governments. It is no grievance in a despotic state, where the political servitude of the whole body takes away the sense of civil slavery. Those who are called freedmen in reality are little more so than they who do not come within that class; and as the latter, in quality of eunuchs, freedmen, or slaves, have generally the management of all affairs, the condition of a freedman and that of a slave are very nearly allied. This makes it therefore almost a matter of indifference whether in such states the slaves be few or numerous.

　　But in moderate governments it is a point of the highest importance that there should not be a great number of slaves. The political liberty of those states adds to the value of civil liberty; and he who is deprived of the latter is also bereft of the former. He sees the happiness of a society, of which he is not so much as a member; he sees the security of others fenced by laws, himself without any protection. He perceives that his master has a soul, capable of enlarging itself: while his own labours under a continual depression. Nothing more assimilates a man to a beast than living among freedmen, himself a slave. Such people as these are natural enemies of society; and their number must be dangerous.

　　It is not therefore to be wondered at that moderate governments have been so frequently disturbed by the revolts of slaves, and that this so seldom happens in despotic states.16

　　13. Of armed Slaves. The danger of arming slaves is not so great in monarchies as in republics. In the former, a warlike people and a body of nobility are a sufficient check upon these armed slaves; whereas the pacific members of a republic would have a hard task to quell a set of men who, having offensive weapons in their hands, would find themselves a match for the citizens.

　　The Goths, who conquered Spain, spread themselves over the country, and soon became very weak. They made three important regulations: they abolished an ancient custom which prohibited intermarriages with the Romans;17 they enacted that all the freedmen18 belonging to the Fiscus should serve in war, under penalty of being reduced to slavery; and they ordained that each Goth should arm and bring into the field the tenth part of his slaves.19 This was but a small proportion: besides, these slaves thus carried to the field did not form a separate body; they were in the army, and might be said to continue in the family.

　　14. The same Subject continued. When a whole nation is of a martial temper, the slaves in arms are less to be feared.

　　By a law of the Alemans, a slave who had committed a clandestine theft20 was liable to the same punishment as a freedman in the like case; but if he was found guilty of an open robbery,21 he was only bound to restore the things so taken. Among the Alemans, courage and intrepidity extenuated the guilt of an action. They employed their slaves in their wars. Most republics have been attentive to dispirit their slaves; but the Alemans, relying on themselves and being always armed, were so far from fearing theirs that they were rather for augmenting their courage; they were the instruments either of their depredations or of their glory.

　　15. Precautions to be used in Moderate Governments. Lenity and humane treatment may prevent the dangers to be apprehended from the multitude of slaves in a moderate government. Men grow reconciled to everything, and even to servitude, if not aggravated by the severity of the master. The Athenians treated their slaves with great lenity; and this secured that state from the commotions raised by the slaves among the austere Laced?monians.

　　It does not appear that the primitive Romans met with any trouble from their slaves. Those civil broils which have been compared to the Punic wars were the consequence of their having divested themselves of all humanity towards their slaves.22

　　A frugal and laborious people generally treat their slaves more kindly than those who are above labour. The primitive Romans used to live, work, and eat with their slaves; in short, they behaved towards them with justice and humanity. The greatest punishment they made them suffer was to make them pass before their neighbours with a forked piece of wood on their backs. Their manners were sufficient to secure the fidelity of their slaves; so that there was no necessity for laws.

　　But when the Romans aggrandised themselves; when their slaves were no longer the companions of their labour, but the instruments of their luxury and pride; as they then wanted morals, they had need of laws. It was even necessary for these laws to be of the most terrible kind, in order to establish the safety of those cruel masters who lived with their slaves as in the midst of enemies.

　　They made the Sillanian Senatus-Consultum, and other laws,23 which decreed that when a master was murdered all the slaves under the same roof, or in any place so near the house as to be within the hearing of a man's voice, should, without distinction, be condemned to die. Those who in this case sheltered a slave, in order to save him, were punished as murderers;24 he whom his master25 ordered to kill him, and who obeyed, was reputed guilty; even he who did not hinder him from killing himself was liable to be punished.26 If a master was murdered on a journey, they put to death those who were with him and those who fled.27 All these laws operated even against persons whose innocence was proved; the intent of them was to inspire their slaves with a prodigious respect for their master. They were not dependent on the civil government, but on a fault or imperfection of the civil government. They were not derived from the equity of civil laws, since they were contrary to the principle of those laws. They were properly founded on the principles of war, with this difference, that the enemies were in the bosom of the state. The Sillanian Senatus-Consultum was derived from the law of nations, which requires that a society, however imperfect, should be preserved.

　　It is a misfortune in government when the magistrates thus find themselves under the necessity of making cruel laws; because they have rendered obedience difficult, they are obliged to increase the penalty of disobedience, or to suspect the slave's fidelity. A prudent legislator foresees the ill consequences of rendering the legislature terrible. The slaves amongst the Romans could have no confidence in the laws; and therefore the laws could have none in them.

　　16. Regulations between Masters and Slaves. The magistrates ought to take care that the slave has his food and raiment; and this should be regulated by law.

　　The laws ought to provide that care be taken of them in sickness and old age. Claudius28 decreed that the slaves who in sickness had been abandoned by their masters should, in case they recovered, be emancipated. This law insured their liberty; but should not there have been some care also taken to preserve their lives?

　　When the law permitted a master to take away the life of his slave, he was invested with a power which he ought to exercise as judge, and not as master; it was necessary, therefore, that the law should ordain those formalities which remove the suspicion of an act of violence.

　　When fathers, at Rome, were no longer permitted to put their children to death, the magistrates ordained the punishment which the father would have inflicted.29 A like custom between the master and his slaves would be highly reasonable in a country where masters have the power of life and death.

　　The law of Moses was extremely severe. If a man struck his servant so that he died under his hand, he was to be punished; but, if he survived a day or two, no punishment ensued, because he was his money.30 Strange that a civil institution should thus relax the law of nature!

　　By a law of the Greeks,31 a slave too severely treated by his master might insist upon being sold to another. In later times there was a law of the same nature at Rome.32 A master displeased with his slave, and a slave with his master, ought to be separated.

　　When a citizen uses the slave of another ill, the latter ought to have the liberty of complaining before the judge. The laws of Plato,33 and of most nations, took away from slaves the right of natural defence. It was necessary then that they should give them a civil defence.

　　At Sparta slaves could have no justice against either insults or injuries. So excessive was their misery, that they were not only the slaves of a citizen, but also of the public; they belonged to all, as well as to one. At Rome, when they considered the injury done to a slave, they had regard only to the interest of the master.34 In the breach of the Aquilian law they confounded a wound given to a beast and that given to a slave; they regarded only the diminution of their value. At Athens,35 he who had abused the slave of another was punished severely, and sometimes even with death. The law of Athens was very reasonable in not adding the loss of security to that of liberty.

　　17. Of Enfranchisements. It is easy to perceive that many slaves in a republican government create a necessity of making many free. The evil is, if they have too great a number of slaves they cannot keep them in due bounds; if they have too many freedmen, they cannot live, and must become a burden to the republic: besides, it may be as much in danger from the multitude of freedmen as from that of slaves. It is necessary, therefore, that the law should have an eye to these two inconveniences.

　　The several laws and decrees of the senate made at Rome, both for and against slaves, sometimes to limit, and at other times to facilitate, their enfranchisement, plainly show the embarrassment in which they found themselves in this respect. There were even times in which they durst not make laws. When, under Nero,36 they demanded of the senate permission for the masters to reduce again to slavery the ungrateful freedmen, the emperor declared that it was their duty to decide the affairs of individuals, and to make no general decree.

　　Much less can I determine what ought to be the regulations of a good republic in such an affair; this depends on too many circumstances. Let us, however, make some reflections.

　　A considerable number of freedmen ought not suddenly to be made by a general law. We known that among the Volsinienses37 the freedmen, becoming masters of the suffrages, enacted an abominable law, which gave them the right of lying the first night with the young women married to the free-born.

　　There are several ways of insensibly introducing new citizens into a republic. The laws may favour the acquiring a peculium, and put slaves into a condition of buying their liberty: they may prescribe a term to servitude, like those of Moses, which limited that of the Hebrew slaves to six years.38 It is easy to enfranchise every year a certain number of those slaves who, by their age, health, or industry, are capable of getting a subsistence. The evil may be even cured in its root, as a great number of slaves are connected with the several employments which are given them; to divide among the free-born a part of these employments, for example, commerce or navigation, is diminishing the number of slaves.

　　When there are many freedmen, it is necessary that the civil laws should determine what they owe to their patron, or that these duties should be fixed by the contract of enfranchisement.

　　It is certain that their condition should be more favoured in the civil than in the political state; because, even in a popular government, the power ought not to fall into the hands of the vulgar.

　　At Rome, where they had so many freedmen, the political laws with regard to them were admirable. They gave them very little, and excluded them almost from nothing: they had even a share in the legislature, but the resolutions they were capable of taking were almost of no weight. They might bear a part in the public offices, and even in the dignity of the priesthood;39 but this privilege was in some sort rendered useless by the disadvantages they had to encounter in the elections. They had a right to enter into the army; but they were to be registered in a certain class of the census before they could be soldiers. Nothing hindered the40 freedmen from being united by marriage with the families of the free-born; but they were not permitted to mix with those of the senator. In short, their children were free-born, though they were not so themselves.

　　18. Of Freedmen and Eunuchs. Thus in a republican government it is frequently of advantage that the situation of the freedmen be but little below that of the free-born, and that the laws be calculated to remove a dislike of their condition. But in a despotic government, where luxury and arbitrary power prevail, they have nothing to do in this respect; the freedmen generally finding themselves above the free-born. They rule in the court of the prince, and in the palaces of the great; and as they study the foibles and not the virtues of their master, they lead him entirely by the former, not by the latter. Such were the freedmen of Rome in the times of the emperors.

　　When the principal slaves are eunuchs, let never so many privileges be granted them, they can hardly be regarded as freedmen. For as they are incapable of having a family of their own, they are naturally attached to that of another: and it is only by a kind of fiction that they are considered as citizens.

　　And yet there are countries where the magistracy is entirely in their hands. "In Tonquin,"41 says Dampier,42 "all the mandarins, civil and military, are eunuchs." They have no families, and though they are naturally avaricious, the master or the prince benefits in the end by this very passion.

　　Dampier tells us, too,43 that in this country the eunuchs cannot live without women, and therefore marry. The law which permits their marriage may be founded partly on their respect for these eunuchs, and partly on their contempt of the fair sex.

　　Thus they are trusted with the magistracy, because they have no family; and permitted to marry, because they are magistrates.

　　Then it is that the sense which remains would fain supply that which they have lost; and the enterprises of despair become a kind of enjoyment. So, in Milton, that spirit who has nothing left but desires, enraged at his degradation, would make use of his impotency itself.

　　We see in the history of China a great number of laws to deprive eunuchs of all civil and military employments; but they always returned to them again. It seems as if the eunuchs of the east were a necessary evil.

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　　1. Justinian, Institutes, i.

　　2. Excepting a few cannibals.

　　3. I mean slavery in a strict sense, as formerly among the Romans, and at present in our colonies.

　　4. Biblioth. Ang., xiii, part II, art. 3.

　　5. See Solis, History of the Conquest of Mexico, and Garcilasso de la Vega, History of the Conquest of Peru.

　　6. Labat, New Voyage to the Isles of America, iv, p. 114, 1728, 12mo.

　　7. Present State of Russia.

　　8. Dampier, Voyages, iii.

　　9. Politics, i. 5.

　　10. As may be seen in the mines of Hartz, in Lower Saxony, and in those of Hungary.

　　11. De Moribus Germanorum, 25.

　　12. Tacitus, De Moribus Germanorum, 20, says the master is not to be distinguished from the slave by any delicacy of living.

　　13. Sir John Chardin, Travels to Persia.

　　14. Sir John Chardin, ii, in his description of the market of Izagour.

　　15. Book i, tit. 32, § 5.

　　16. The revolt of the Mamelukes was a different case; this was a body of the militia who usurped the empire.

　　17. Law of the Visigoths, iii, tit. 1, § 1.

　　18. Ibid., v, tit. 7, § 20.

　　19. Ibid., v, tit. 2, § 9.

　　20. Law of the Alemans, 5, § 3.

　　21. Ibid., § 5, per virtutem.

　　22. "Sicily," says Florus, "suffered more in the Servile than in the Punic war." — iii. 19.

　　23. See the whole title of the senat. cons. Sillan., ff.

　　24. Leg. Si quis, § 12, ff. de senat. cons. Sillan.

　　25. When Antony commanded Eros to kill him, it was the same as commanding him to kill himself; because, if he had obeyed, he would have been punished as the murderer of his master.

　　26. Leg. i, § 22, ff. de senat. cons. Sillan.

　　27. Leg. i, § 31, ff. ibid., xxix, tit. 5.

　　28. Xiphilin, In Claudio.

　　29. See Leg. 3, in Cod., De Patria potestate, by the Emperor Alexander.

　　30. Exod., 21. 20, 21.

　　31. Plutarch, On Superstition.

　　32. See the constitution of Antoninus Pius, Institutes, i, tit. 7.

　　33. Laws, Book ix.

　　34. This was frequently the spirit of the laws of those nations who came out of Germany, as may be seen by their codes.

　　35. Demosthenes, Orat. contra Midian, p. 610, Frankfort, 1604.

　　36. Tacitus, Annals, xiii. 27.

　　37. Freinshemius, Supplement, dec. 2, v.

　　38. Exod., 21.

　　39. Tacitus, Annals, xiii. 27.

　　40. Augustus's speech in Dio, lvi.

　　41. It was formerly the same in China. The two Mahometan Arabs who travelled thither in the ninth century use the word eunuch whenever they speak of a governor of the city.

　　42. Volume iii, p. 91.

　　43. Ibid., p. 94.